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Introduction
Politicians aspire to deep cuts in greenhouse gas emissions. The European Union has pledged to reduce 2050 emissions to 50% of their 2005 levels. President Obama has made a similar promise. The United Kingdom even wants to cut emissions by 80% by mid-century. These are aspirations only, but they do beg the questions whether such deep targets are desirable and even feasible. This paper, together with the other papers in this special issue, contributes to answering these questions.
Previous papers have studied the feasibility of stringent targets for climate policy (den Elzen et al. 2007; Edmonds et al. 2008b; Edmonds et al. 2008a; van Vuuren et al. 2006 ).
Few studies, however, explicitly report on the potential infeasibility (van Vuuren,
Eickhout, Lucas, & den Elzen 2006). The Fourth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Barker et al. 2007) suggests that deep emission cuts are feasible, but their summary unfortunately suffers from selection bias.
That is, their cost estimates do not correct for the fact that some models do not report results for some policy targets because these targets cannot be met according to these models (Tol 2007) . This special issue sheds some light on the matter by focusing on three targets for the stabilization of the concentrations of greenhouse gases, at least one of which is potentially infeasible. The current paper, however, considers a continuum of targets and spans the feasibility space -at least for a single model. I also show a range of sensitivity analyses. Furthermore, I go beyond technical feasibility and assess the political feasibility of climate policy targets, which are, after all, self-imposed.
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 sketches the model. The results are presented in two parts. In Section 3, we look at the effect of a range of carbon taxes in a range of circumstances, with regard to both the parameterization of the model and the timing of the imposition of the carbon tax. In Section 4, we compare the carbon taxes to the stated willingness to pay and the estimated social cost of carbon; and we assess the income transfers needed to sustain early involvement of non-OECD countries in climate policy.
Section 5 concludes.
Model and scenarios
I use Version 2.9 of the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution (FUND). Version 2.9 of FUND has the same basic structure as previous versions (Tol 1999; Tol 2005; Tol 2006 period is only used for calibration, and the years beyond 2100 are used for the approximating the social cost of carbon under low discount rates. The scenarios up to the year 2100 are based on the EMF14 Standardized Scenario, which lies somewhere in between IS92a and IS92f (Leggett et al. 1992) . For the years from 2100 onward, the values are extrapolated from the pre-2100 scenarios. Radiative forcing is based (Shine et al. 1990 ). The global mean temperature is governed by a geometric buildup to its equilibrium (determined by the radiative forcing) with a half-life of 50 years. In the base case, the global mean temperature increases by 2.5˚C in equilibrium for a doubling of carbon dioxide equivalents.
FUND has elaborate modules for the impact of climate change (Tol 2002) , but these are not used here.
FUND considers emission reduction of the three main greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide. For methane and nitrous oxide, simple abatement cost curves are used (Tol 2006) . For carbon dioxide, the model is more elaborate. Initially, marginal abatement costs rise more than proportionally with abatement effort, but marginal costs become linear above $100/tC. There are mild intertemporal spillovers between and within regions that reduce costs (Tol 2005) . In the early decades, a 1% emission reduction from baseline would cost roughly 0.01% of GDP, and a 10% reduction would cost 1%.
The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide follows from a five-box model:
where α i denotes the fraction of emissions E (in million metric tonnes of carbon) that is allocated to Box i (0.13, 0.20, 0.32, 0.25 and 0.10, respectively) and ρ the decay-rate of the boxes (ρ = exp(-1/lifetime), with life-times infinity, 363, 74, 17 and 2 years, respectively). The model is due to (Maier-Reimer & Hasselmann 1987) , its parameters are due to (Hammitt et al. 1992) . Thus, 13% of total emissions remains forever in the atmosphere, while 10% is -on average -removed in two years. Carbon dioxide concentrations are measured in parts per million by volume.
There is a feedback from climate change on the amount of carbon dioxide that is stored and emitted by the terrestrial biosphere. Instead of modelling the full dynamics, I keep the uptake by the terrestrial biosphere as it is -that is, Equation (1) Because of the slow turnover of the capital stock, any future emission reduction target should lead to immediate emission reduction. Note also that the delayed participation scenario also has a transition period, in which marginal abatement costs rise faster than the discount rate. Abatement is time inconsistent during this transition period. This implies that results are somewhat peculiar, as shown below. Figure 1 shows target radiative forcing as a function of the initial carbon tax in 2013. All regions implement the same tax from 2013 onwards. The baseline scenario is FUND. The terrestrial carbon cycle feedback is set at its best guess. Three alternative targets are chosen. First, the target is the maximum radiative forcing in the 21 st century. Second, the target is radiative forcing in the year 2100. This target allows for some overshoot, that is, radiative forcing may be higher before 2100. Third, the target is radiative forcing in the year 2200. This allows for considerable overshoot.
Technical feasibility
Figure 1 reveals that target radiative forcing declines rapidly for small carbon taxes.
However, the incremental effect of a tax increase shrinks as the tax gets higher, and the curve goes almost flat for very high taxes. For low taxes, it does not make much of difference whether the target is the maximum radiative forcing or radiative forcing in 2100. For higher taxes, there is a difference. Specifically, the 2.5Wm -2 target cannot be met without overshoot (for an initial tax below $1000/tC). If the radiative forcing target is for 2200, more can be achieved for the same tax, but of course at the price of greater global warming in the intermediate period. If all greenhouse gas emissions are driven to zero, carbon dioxide concentrations will not revert to pre-industrial times. Figure 2 shows the committed radiative forcing, which much lower than radiative forcing in the 21 st century. Policy can cut committed radiative forcing from 2.5 Wm -2 to 1.0 Wm -2 , and can come close to that for a relatively modest initial carbon tax. That is, really deep targets are feasible in the very long run. Finally, Figure 2 shows the global mean warming in 2100. Without climate policy, the world would warm some 3.5ºC. This can be kept below 2.0ºC (in the 21 st century), but only for a carbon tax of $1000/tC, starting in 2013 and rising with the rate of discount, and applied to all greenhouse gas emissions in all countries. The feedback of the terrestrial carbon cycle has another effect, not shown in Figure 5 .
Without a carbon tax, the maximum radiative forcing is attained in 2100. Without the feedback of the terrestrial carbon cycle, a carbon tax reduces the maximum radiative forcing, and shifts it to an earlier year. For very high taxes, the maximum may be as early as 2017. However, with a terrestrial carbon cycle feedback, the maximum is not shifted in time. That is, the already committed warming is such that emissions from the terrestrial biosphere will lead to a steady increase in the concentration of carbon dioxide, regardless of climate policy. cost-benefit analysis and willingness to pay. Section 3 finds that climate policy would be considerably cheaper (for the same target) or more effective (for the same cost) if non-OECD countries reduce their emissions as well -but few of these countries have shown any willingness. I therefore also consider the capital flows that would be needed to ensure non-OECD participation. Before all that, however, I discuss the impact of the 9 feasible EMF22 policies. Table 1 summarizes the costs of meeting the three radiative forcing targets of the EMF22 exercise, with and without overshoot, and with and without a delay in the participation of non-OECD countries. Figure 7 depicts the net present cost and the initial carbon tax. Table 2 shows the implications for carbon dioxide emissions. Table 1 reveals moderate costs of emission reduction for the countries of the "OECD" for the less stringent target, and considerable costs for the 2.6 Wm -2 target. Still, the 20% drop in GDP in 2100 relative to the baseline scenario should be seen against an increase in GDP of 330% between 2010 and 2100 in the baseline scenario. Non-OECD countries register higher losses than the OECD because their economies are more carbon-intensive to start with. Yet, abatement costs are small relative to the projected economic growth.
4.

Political feasibility
Economic impact
While a delay in climate policy would lead to lower (or zero) costs in the short-term, the long-term costs are higher because the carbon tax is disproportionally higher to make up for the decades without abatement.
Figure 7 reveals that the stabilization target is by far the most important driver of the cost of emission reduction, followed by the degree of participation. Whether overshoot is allowed or not is of secondary concern, particularly with full participation and less ambitious targets. Figure 7 also shows that, for any pairwise comparison of policies, the carbon tax accelerates faster than the net present cost if (a) the target is made more stringent; (b) participation is restricted; and (c) overshoot is disallowed. Table 2 shows that, regardless of the target and the country, the economy is almost completely decarbonised by 2100: emissions are 90% or more below baseline, and 80% or more below 2000. Differences appear in 2050, but emission reduction (from baseline)
is greater than 35% in all policies and regions, and greater than 70% in non-OECD regions. The difference between OECD and non-OECD underlines that abatement is cheaper outside the OECD. The carbon tax needs to be so high to achieve the lower targets because low targets cannot be met without emission reduction in the OECD.
Indeed, for the 4.5 Wm -2 target with full participation, OECD emissions continue to increase (relative to 2000) until 2050, albeit more slowly than in the baseline scenario.
The differences between policies and regions are even starker in 2020. Hardly any emission reduction is required in the OECD to meet the 4.5 Wm -2 target, while the 2.6
Wm -2 requires a 90% (from baseline) emission reduction in the Rest of the World.
Cost-benefit analysis
In a cost-benefit analysis, emission reduction is chosen such that the marginal abatement cost equals the marginal benefit, that is, the climate damage avoided. Figure 8 shows the survival function (one minus the cumulative density function) of the marginal benefit of emission reduction (Tol 2008 ). Figure 8 also shows the initial carbon tax for the 9 policies of Table 1.
Figure 8 reveals that there is almost a 60% chance that a 4.5 Wm -2 target would pass the cost-benefit test, if all countries participate from 2013 onwards. However, the probability of passing the cost-benefit test drops to below 40% if non-OECD regions delay abatement. With full participation, a 3.7 Wm -2 target has only a 30% chance of passing the cost-benefit test, and this drops to below 5% with delayed actions outside the OECD.
Willingness to pay
Cost-benefit analysis of climate change is controversial, and estimates of the marginal damage cost of climate change are uncertain. Instead, one could directly estimate the willingness to pay for climate policy. Figure 9 shows the results of the three studies that have done this (Lee & Cameron 2008; Li et al. 2004; Viscusi & Zeckhauser 2006) , each of which estimates the fraction of the US population who would be willing to sacrifice a given share of their income in return for reduced greenhouse gas emissions. As in Figure   7 , this is compared to the costs of selected policies from Table 1 . Figure 9 reveals that the median US household would support a 3.7 Wm -2 target, perhaps without immediate action outside the OECD. This is in contrast to the results shown in Figure 8 . Figure 9 also reveals that more aggressive targets would be supported by a minority of US households only; and that more lenient targets would gather widespread support.
International transfers
The results above reveal that climate policy would be substantially cheaper (for a given target) or that policy targets could be substantially more ambitious (for a given willingness to pay) if all countries agree to reduce emissions. To date, only OECD countries have shown the political will to abate greenhouse gas emissions, and key non-OECD countries have explicitly ruled this out in the short and medium term. Therefore, some form of side payment would be necessary to induce non-OECD countries to reduce their emissions. Table 3 shows one form of side payment. The results in Table 3 allocation of the OECD is such that the global emission cap equals that in the "full participation" scenario -that is, the OECD makes good the shortfall in emission reduction in the non-OECD countries. Under these assumptions (and abstracting from the impact of permit trade on economic growth), the permit price equals the carbon tax in the "full participation" scenario, and the trade volume is the difference in emissions between the "full participation" and the "delayed participation" scenarios. Table 3 shows the trade volume, the price, and the trade value relative to GDP.
The trade volume is rather substantial. As shown in Table 2 Permit exports could rise to almost 20% of GDP for the Rest of the World, an unprecedented commercial opportunity for some of these countries. Figure 10 shows the net present value of the consumer and producer surplus of permit trade. The OECD has a consumer surplus only, and the Rest of the World has a producer surplus only, while the BRIC countries shift from exporters to importers of emission permits. Figure 10 shows the net present value because interregional trade interacts with intertemporal trade (aka banking and borrowing). be such that developing countries could even accept a target that is slightly below their projected emissions, and still be better off (Tol & Rehdanz 2008) .
For the 3.7 Wm -2 target, the OECD also benefits from permit trade. This is not the case for the 4. Climate policy would reduce the maximum radiative forcing in the 21 st century, but incremental climate policy has a diminishing impact on radiative forcing. This is independent of the baseline scenario. More ambitious targets can be met if more countries reduce their emissions. The same tax would achieve more if abatement costs are lower.
Targets that are formulated in terms of the eventual radiative forcing can be more stringent than targets formulated in terms of the maximum radiative forcing. Carbon dioxide emissions from the impact of climate change on the terrestrial biosphere hamper the success of climate policy. A target of 2.6 Wm -2 , or 2ºC warming above pre-industrial times, is infeasible under any but the most advantageous of assumptions. 
